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“My Own Worst Enemy”:
Translating Hamartia in Sixteenth-Century Italy1
bryan brazeau
The University of Warwick
This article considers the ways in which Aristotle’s notion of hamartia (ἁμαρτία) in the Poetics—the 
tragic fault that leads to the protagonist’s downfall—was rendered in sixteenth-century translations 
and commentaries produced in Italy. While early Latin translations and commentaries initially 
translated the term as error, mid-Cinquecento literary critics and theorists frequently used a term 
that implied sin: peccatum/peccato. Was this linguistic choice among sixteenth-century translators 
indicative of a broader attempt to Christianize the Poetics? While there were significant attempts on 
the part of translators and commentators to moralize the Poetics, this study of how hamartia was 
translated suggests that such interpretations were not Counter-Reformation distortions of Aristotle’s 
Poetics but rather part of a broader program of cultural translation—expressing the linguistic 
influence of a religious public, but not necessarily a moralizing interpretation—domesticating the 
Greek philosopher for an early modern Christian audience.
Cet article considère les façons dont l’hamartia (ἁμαρτία) aristotélicienne—la faute tragique qui 
déclenche la chute du protagoniste—a été rendue dans les traductions et les commentaires de la 
Poétique produits en Italie au seizième siècle. Alors que les premières traductions et commentaires 
en latin, traduisaient le terme par error, dès le milieu du siècle on emploie fréquemment peccatum / 
peccato, un terme qui dénote le péché. Ce choix linguistique révèle-t-il un effort en vue d’imposer une 
1. Research leading to this publication was funded by the European Research Council under the European 
Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP/2007–2013) / ERC Starting Grant 2013 – 335949 (“Aristotle 
in the Italian Vernacular: Rethinking Renaissance and Early-Modern Intellectual History”). Additional 
research support was provided by a postdoctoral research startup grant from the Fonds de Recherche du 
Québec, Société et Culture (B2) and by grants from the University of Warwick’s Humanities Research 
Centre (Summer Research Fund, Transatlantic Fellowship). Heartfelt thanks are due to David Lines and 
Simon Gilson for their encouraging feedback, insightful comments, and patience throughout the research 
and drafting of this article. Daniel Javitch, Alessio Cotugno, Peter Mack, Shannon McHugh, and Claudia 
Rossignoli were helpful interlocutors on various aspects of the argument. Thanks are also due to Danilo 
Facca, Valentina Lepri, Cecilia Muratori, and Eugenio Refini who organized the 2016 “Renaissance in 
Translation” conference (funded by Villa I Tatti and held at the Polish Academy of Sciences in Warsaw), 
where I received excellent feedback on an early version of this paper; equal thanks are due to David Lines 
and Anna Laura Puliafito for their organization of the 2017 “In Other Words: Translating Philosophy in 
the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries” conference at the University of Warwick, which again enabled me 
to obtain constructive feedback on this topic. I am also grateful to the patient and helpful staff in the rare 
books and manuscript collections at the Newberry Library (Chicago) and the British Library (London).
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interprétation chrétienne de la Poétique? Certes, il y a eu d’importantes tentatives de moralisation 
de la Poétique au seizième siècle, mais cette étude montre que ces manières de traduire l’hamartia 
résultent d’un effort pour proposer une traduction du philosophe grec accessible au public chrétien de 
la Renaissance que d’une distorsion du texte induite par la Contre-Réforme.
Introduction
Aristotle’s notion of hamartia (ἀμαρτία)—the error that precipitates a character’s tragic downfall—was translated and adapted for sixteenth-
century audiences within a context of fierce literary debates over Aristotle’s 
Poetics and the religious upheaval of the Catholic Church’s theological, 
political, and cultural responses to the threat of the Protestant Reformation.2 
It may not be surprising, then, that a number of commentaries, translations, 
and poetic treatises in the period rendered Aristotle’s hamartia with the Italian 
word for sin, peccato, rather than errore. Yet, this phenomenon leads us to ask 
to what extent did the religious culture of the sixteenth century impact the 
vernacular reception of Aristotle’s Poetics? Despite the rich material available 
to scholars, this topic remains largely unexplored. This article confronts the 
question through a focused case study on the interpretation of Aristotle’s 
concept of hamartia. More specifically, it investigates why hamartia was often 
translated as peccatum or peccato in commentaries and translations from the 
period. Was this rendering simply a lexical variant handed down by earlier 
translators and commentators? Or did it instead indicate a broader strategy 
of cultural domestication on the part of authors and translators who aimed to 
adapt Aristotle’s notion of hamartia—and the Poetics more generally—for an 
early modern Christian readership? With respect to the concept of hamartia, 
it appears that heavy-handed religious interpretations did not occur as neatly 
or as evenly as may be assumed. While peccato and errore were not used 
interchangeably, peccato was rarely used to posit a religious interpretation 
2. See James Hankins, “The Popes and Humanism,” in Rome Reborn: The Vatican Library and Renaissance 
Culture, ed. Anthony Grafton (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 47–85. For an excellent 
overview of the Counter-Reformation’s impact on poetry and literature, see Jennifer Helm, Poetry and 
Censorship in Counter-Reformation Italy (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2015). A broader discussion of the 
Counter-Reformation’s impact on Italian culture is available in Adriano Prosperi, Il Concilio di Trento 
e la Controriforma (Trent: UCT, 1999) and Tribunali della coscienza: inquisitori, confessori, missionari 
(Turin: Einaudi, 1996); and Weitse de Boer, The Conquest of the Soul: Confessions, Discipline, and Public 
Order in Counter-Reformation Milan (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2001). 
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of hamartia. Nevertheless, the use of peccato, combined with the glossing of 
hamartia by recourse to other Aristotelian works—such as the Nicomachean 
Ethics—led to an increasing emphasis on whether the tragic error was voluntary 
or involuntary and thus worthy of forgiveness.
In order to address this topic, the article will first review Aristotle’s 
definition of hamartia in the Poetics and consider how the term peccato was 
defined in sixteenth-century Italy. It will then examine how the major published 
commentaries of the period rendered Aristotle’s notion of hamartia in Latin 
and in Italian. While such analysis is certainly important for intellectual history 
and classical reception, this article primarily employs lenses borrowed from 
cultural and translation studies; its focus will thus be on the lexical choices made 
by various commentators and translators, rather than their understandings—
now often considered to be incorrect—of how hamartia fits within the broader 
dramatic ecology of the Poetics. Scholarship on commentaries on Aristotle’s 
Poetics has often been driven by philological concerns regarding the accuracy of 
interpretation; readings that deviate from our contemporary understanding of 
Aristotle’s text have often been ascribed to the distorting moralizing influence 
of the Counter-Reformation and summarily dismissed. This approach, 
moreover, is not limited to sixteenth-century commentaries; up until quite 
recently, interpretation of hamartia in the Poetics continued to be the subject of 
virulent debates, which included the persistence of moralizing interpretations.3 
The present article, however, treats a number of perspectives that played a key 
role in domesticating hamartia for a sixteenth-century audience conversant 
with both Christian belief and Aristotelian moral philosophy, most notably the 
complex interpretation provided by Lodovico Castelvetro.
Aristotle’s Poetics was the subject of many translations and commentaries 
in early modern Italy.4 Despite initial interest in the text by Angelo Poliziano 
3. See, for example, Alexandre Ničev, “À propos de la Poétique d’Aristote,” Revue des Études Grecques 
99.470–71 (1986): 153–60, 158–59, and La catharsis tragique d’Aristote. Nouvelles contributions (Sofia : 
Éditions de l’Université de Sofia “Kliment Ohridski,” 1982).
4. For a comprehensive, albeit dated, account of the reception of the Poetics in sixteenth-century Italy, 
see Bernard Weinberg, A History of Literary Criticism in the Italian Renaissance, 2 vols. (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1961), 2:349–634. A more recent and succinct summary regarding this 
reception is provided by Enrica Zanin, “Les commentaires modernes de la Poétique d’Aristote,” Études 
littéraires 43.2 (2012): 55–83, and by Daniel Javitch, “The Assimilation of Aristotle’s Poetics in Sixteenth-
Century Italy,” in The Cambridge History of Literary Criticism: Volume 3, The Renaissance, ed. Glyn P. 
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and Giorgio Valla, the first complete Latin translation of the text by Alessandro 
Pazzi de’ Medici was not published until 1536. In the early 1540s, Alessandro 
Piccolomini invited Bartolomeo Lombardi to give a series of lectures on the 
Poetics to the Accademia degli Infiammati in Padua, which were ultimately 
delivered by his student Vincenzo Maggi after Lombardi’s untimely death in 
1541.5 Maggi also held a series of lectures on the Poetics in Ferrara, and would 
go on to publish an important commentary on the text in 1550.6 The first major 
commentary, however, was published by Francesco Robortello in 1548, followed 
rapidly by the first translation and commentary in the Italian vernacular by 
Bernardo Segni in 1549, and a Latin commentary by the Florentine scholar 
Piero Vettori in 1560.7 The latter half of the sixteenth and the early seventeenth 
centuries then saw an explosion of vernacular commentaries, treatises, and 
literary debates focused on ideas emerging from the Poetics.8 
Norton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 53–65. For the importance of the Poetics as a 
text used to provide categories for emerging conceptions of genre, see Daniel Javitch, “The Emergence 
of Poetic Genre Theory in the Sixteenth Century,” Modern Language Quarterly 59.2 (1998): 139–69. 
For a rich discussion of the vernacularization of the Poetics in sixteenth-century Italy, particularly with 
reference to the first Italian translation and commentary by Bernardo Segni (1548), see Simone Bionda, 
“La Poetica di Aristotele volgarizzata: Bernardo Segni e le sue fonti,” Aevum 75.3 (2001): 679–94.
5. On the relationship between Piccolomini, Maggi, and Lombardi see Alessio Cotugno, “Le Annotationi 
di Piccolomini e la Poetica di Castelvetro a confronto: tecnica argomentativa, vocabolario critico, 
dispositivi esegetici,” in Forms of Conflict and Rivalries in Renaissance Europe, ed. David A. Lines, Marc 
Laureys, and Jill Kraye (Bonn: Bonn University Press, 2015), 161–206, 167–68.
6. Vincenzo Maggi and Bartolomeo Lombardi, Vincentii Madii Brixiani et Bartholomaei Lombardi 
Veronensis in Aristotelis librum de poetica communes explanationes (Venice: Valgrisi, 1550). Notes from 
Maggi’s lectures in Ferrara taken by one of his students, Alessandro Sardi, are preserved in a manuscript 
in the Biblioteca Estense di Modena, lat.88=alfa.Q.6.14, 18r–86v. While the manuscript is dated “15 Cal. 
Februarj MDXLVI” (18r), the notes appear to be those on Maggi’s lectures from 1543. An overview of 
the manuscript’s contents and Maggi’s method is provided by Weinberg, A History of Literary Criticism, 
1:376–78. Having consulted the manuscript for this research, I must concur with Maggi in his assertion 
that “Sardi’s handwriting, notorious among scholars at the Estense, is practically undecipherable” (1:376).
7. Francesco Robortello, In librum Aristotelis de arte poetica explicationes (1548; repr., Munich: Wilhelm 
Fink Verlag, 1968); Bernardo Segni, Rettorica e Poetica d’Aristotile tradotte di greco in lingua vulgare 
fiorentina (Florence: Lorenzo Torrentino, 1549); Piero Vettori, Petri Victorii commentarii, in primum 
librum Aristotelis de arte poetarum (Florence: Giunti, 1560). 
8. Of the twenty-two works on the Poetics with known dates included in the Vernacular Aristotelianism 
in Renaissance Italy (VARI) database, only three are published prior to 1550. See Eugenio Refini, David 
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Scholarship on the reception of Aristotle’s Poetics in early modern Italy 
has often emphasized how the text was read within a tradition that considered 
poetry from a rhetorical perspective. Weinberg’s seminal A History of Literary 
Criticism in the Italian Renaissance and Baxter Hathaway’s Age of Criticism 
both emphasized how the Poetics was distorted in order to be assimilated to 
a tradition of rhetorically-inflected literary criticism influenced by Aristotle’s 
Rhetoric, Horace’s Ars Poetica, and the rhetorical treatises of Cicero and 
Quintilian.9 This rhetorical emphasis of poetry’s effects upon an audience was 
combined with the assumption that Aristotle’s Poetics served as a response to 
Platonic condemnations of poetry, prompting many critics, translators, and 
commentators to find justification in the Poetics—particularly in Aristotle’s 
notion of catharsis—for the moral function of poetry.10 
Despite their immense value in mapping and delimiting the field, the New 
Critical biases of Weinberg’s and Hathaway’s studies—what Kristine Louise 
Haugen has termed an interest in “actively redeploying Aristotle’s literary ideas” 
of formal criticism—continue to shape current scholarship on early modern 
literary criticism, which often dismisses eclectic and moralizing interpretations 
Lines, and Bryan Brazeau, Vernacular Aristotelianism in Renaissance Italy Database, accessed 4 April 
2017, vari.warwick.ac.uk/. 
9. Weinberg, A History of Literary Criticism, 1:111–55; Baxter Hathaway, The Age of Criticism: The Late 
Renaissance in Italy (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1962). On the Horatian reception of Aristotle’s 
Poetics see Adelheid Conte, “La rinascita della poetica nel Cinquecento italiano,” in La Poetica di 
Aristotele e la sua storia: atti della giornata internazionale di studio organizzata dal seminario di greco 
in memoria di Viviana Cessi (Pavia, 22 Febbraio 2002), ed. Diego Lanza and Viviana Cessi (Pisa: ETS, 
2002), 45–58, 51. Weinberg notes that many of the early treatises on “arts of poetry” in the first half of 
the Cinquecento, such as Marco Girolamo Vida’s De arte poetica (1527), Gian Giorgio Trissino’s La 
poetica I–IV (1529), and Bernardino Daniello’s La poetica (1536), all demonstrate strong rhetorical and 
Horatian inflections in their emphases on rhetorical devices and on the poet’s role in teaching men to 
live well (A History of Literary Criticism, 2:715–30).
10. Aristotle, Poetics, 1449b25–28. The classic discussion of catharsis in Renaissance commentaries is 
Hathaway’s analysis in The Age of Criticism, 205–300. For a philological approach to Aristotle’s use of 
catharsis and the influence of ancient medical terminology, see Carlo Diano, “La catarsi tragica,” in 
Saggezza e poetiche degli antichi (Venice: N. Pozza, 1968), 215–80; and Diano, “Francesco Robortello 
interprete della catarsi,” in Studi e saggi di filosofia antica (Padua: Antenore, 1973), 321–30. For a 
linguistic approach to the term in Renaissance translations of the Poetics, see Riccardo Tesi, Aristotele 
in italiano: i grecisimi nelle traduzioni rinascimentali della ‘Poetica’ (Florence: Accademia della Crusca, 
1997), 117–69.
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of the Poetics from the period as misguided.11 For example, Michael Lurje has 
recently commented on how most early modern commentaries on the Poetics 
integrated Aristotle’s text to contemporary critical approaches by eliciting 
unwilling responses from the text to their own theoretical and increasingly 
moralistic concerns.12 Within this line of thought, it would seem that the 
translation of hamartia with peccatum/peccato lends further evidence for 
moralizing—even religious—approaches to the Poetics in this period. As will 
be discussed below, careful attention to key translations and commentaries, 
however, demonstrates that the substitution of peccato for hamartia appears 
to be primarily a lexical variant on the part of such authors, handed down 
from one commentator and translator to another, rather than indicative of a 
religious interpretation. Hamartia was primarily interpreted through the lens 
of Aristotelian moral philosophy in the literary debate on Speroni’s Canace 
and in commentaries by Robortello, Maggi, Vettori, and Piccolomini, while 
only Lodovico Castelvetro offered an explicitly religious interpretation. This 
inquiry will thus also serve to highlight two important interpretive frameworks 
that shaped the reception of the Poetics, yet which have often been ignored by 
11. Kristine Louise Haugen, “The Birth of Tragedy in the Cinquecento: Humanism and Literary 
History,” Journal of the History of Ideas 72.3 (2011): 351–70, 352. Weinberg’s New Critical approach is 
evident throughout his History of Literary Criticism. His thesis, that increasingly powerful moralizing 
lenses were applied to Aristotle’s text, has rarely been questioned. It is only in recent years that scholars 
such as Brigitte Kappl have begun to revisit this approach, highlighting instead an increasing emphasis 
on formal elements of poetry as a signal of growing aesthetic independence; see Kappl, “Profit, Pleasure, 
and Purgation: Catharsis in Aristotle, Paolo Beni and Italian Late Renaissance Poetics,” Skenè Journal of 
Theatre and Drama Studies 2.1 (2016): 105–32. Kappl has also argued through attentive close reading 
of Renaissance commentaries that we may read the increased focus on formal aspects of poetry in 
these texts as evidence of a new independence of the aesthetic realm from moral concerns; see Kappl, 
“Aristotelian Katharsis in Renaissance Poetics,” in La poètica renaixentista a Europa: una recreació del 
llegat clàssic, ed. Josep Solervicens and Antoni L. Moll (Barcelona: Punctum & Mimesi, 2011), 69–97.
12. Michael Lurje, “Facing up to Tragedy: Toward an Intellectual History of Sophocles in Europe from 
Camerarius to Nietzsche,” in A Companion to Sophocles, ed. Kirk Ormand (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 
2012), 440–55, 444–45. Lurje’s teleological emphasis is also evident in his broader discussion of the 
history of interpretation of hamartia with relation to Sophocles’s Oedipus. See Lurje, Die Suche nach der 
Schuld, Sophokles’ Oedipus Rex, Aristoteles’ Poetik und das Tragödienverständnis der Neuzeit (Berlin: De 
Gruyter, 2004).
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scholarship: the religious culture of the Catholic Reformation and the firmly 
established traditions of Latin and vernacular Aristotelian thought.13 
 Hamartia in Aristotle’s Poetics
Hamartia is a complex term in Aristotle’s Poetics. As Jan Bremer has 
demonstrated, while it originally meant “missing the mark” in Homeric 
Greek—used for arrows and spears that failed to hit their targets—it 
subsequently acquired connotations of moral errancy or offence in the works 
of ancient orators, tragedians, and historians. By the time of Plato and Aristotle, 
the term was widely used to indicate a moral error worthy of condemnation, a 
metaphoric usage that would continue throughout the Alexandrian period and 
later be used to indicate “sin” in the Christian Bible.14 Aristotle, however, often 
13. On Renaissance Aristotelianism see the pioneering studies of Charles Schmitt, Aristotle and the 
Renaissance (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983) and The Aristotelian Tradition and 
Renaissance Universities (London: Variorum Reprints, 1984); F. Edward Cranz, A Bibliography of Aristotle 
Editions, 1501–1600, 2nd ed., addenda and corrections by Charles Schmitt (Baden-Baden: V. Koerner, 
1984); and Charles Lohr, Latin Aristotle Commentaries II: Renaissance Authors (Florence: Olschki, 1988). 
More recently, see Luca Bianchi, Studi sull’aristotelismo del Rinascimento (Padua: Il Poligrafo, 2003) 
and “Per una storia dell’aristotelismo ‘volgare’ nel Rinascimento. Problemi e prospettive di ricerca,” 
Bruniana & Campanelliana 15.2 (2009): 367–85; David Lines, Aristotle’s Ethics in the Italian Renaissance 
(ca. 1350–1600): The Universities and the Problem of Moral Education (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2002) 
and “Beyond Latin in Renaissance Philosophy: A Plea for New Critical Perspectives,” Intellectual History 
Review 25.4 (2015): 373–89; Jill Kraye, Classical Traditions in Renaissance Philosophy (London: Ashgate, 
2002); David A. Lines and Eugenio Refini, eds., Aristotele fatto volgare (Pisa: Edizioni ETS, 2014); 
and Luca Bianchi, Simon Gilson, and Jill Kraye, eds., Vernacular Aristotelianism in Renaissance Italy 
(London: The Warburg Institute, 2016).
14. Jan Maarten Bremer, Hamartia: Tragic Error in the Poetics of Aristotle and in Greek Tragedy (Amsterdam: 
Adolf M. Hakkert, 1969), 1–63. Bremer provides a rigorous philological analysis that traces the usage 
and various meanings of ἁμαρτία in ancient Greek from Homer to Aristotle. His study also convincingly 
demonstrates “a continuous semantic shift” from the Homeric sense of ἁμαρτία toward a connotation 
of moral offence (in the works of Plato, for example). Indeed, as Bremer demonstrates, the widespread 
metaphoric usage of ἁμαρτία already in his own day prompted Thucydides to use διαμαρτάνειν in order 
to indicate the original Homeric sense of “missing the mark.” This shift from literal to metaphorical 
registers continues to the extent where in both the Septuagint and the New Testament, ἁμαρτία never 
“occurs in its literal [i.e., Homeric] meaning, and even dihamartanein is used to denote sin” (Bremer, 
60). For a clear and succinct discussion of Aristotle’s use of hamartia within the Poetics, see Stephen 
Haliwell, Aristotle’s Poetics (1986; repr., London: Duckworth, 1998), 215–26. Haliwell concludes that 
“the inherent indeterminacy of tragic hamartia should be seen to be the consequence of a tension within 
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uses the term in the Poetics to indicate “artistic mistakes committed by a poet or 
a playwright,” not moral errors worthy of condemnation or punishment. Such 
usage sets Aristotle’s text apart from that of contemporary orators, and from 
Plato himself who used hamartia primarily to indicate vicious actions worthy 
of moral condemnation.15
In the Poetics, Aristotle writes that the best tragedies should induce pity 
and fear in the audience by representing “terrifying and pitiable” events; pity is 
felt for a person undeserving of her misfortune, while fear is felt for someone 
like one’s self. After dismissing various plots that would fail to do this (i.e., good 
men undergoing a change from fortune to misfortune, bad men passing from 
misfortune to good fortune, or completely villainous men falling from good 
fortune into misfortune), Aristotle settles upon the following description of the 
tragic protagonist:
There remains, then, the person intermediate between these. Such a 
person is one who neither is superior [to us] in virtue and justice, nor 
undergoes a change to misfortune because of vice and wickedness, but 
the theory of tragedy itself ”; as the term possesses “no particular English translation,” he advocates “for 
avoiding a consistent translation for the term” (222).
15. Bremer, 53–54. Bremer’s argument for Aristotle’s anachronous use of the term is supported 
by his readings of chapters 10–11, 14, and 16 of the Poetics, where he demonstrates that Aristotle’s 
definitions of the key notions of peripetia, pathos, and anagnorisis all rely upon and continuously 
suppose “something like ignorance or blunder,” rather than a morally condemnable action (61–63). 
Françoise Lamoureux has noted that while the Platonic definition of hamartia contains pre-Christian 
intimations of the concept of sin, it ultimately diverges in its emphases on inattention and involuntary 
action. See Françoise Lamoureux, “Peccato o hamartia in Platone?,” Sapienza 36 (1993): 313–21. Recent 
scholarship has called attention to the harmonization of Platonic and Aristotelian ideas in Neoplatonic 
thought and its influence during the Italian Renaissance. See, for example, Lloyd P. Gerson, Aristotle and 
Other Platonists (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), particularly 242–74 with regard to Aristotle’s 
Ethics; and Ilsetraut Hadot, Athenian and Alexandrian Neoplatonism and the Harmonization of Aristotle 
and Plato, trans. Michael Chase (Leiden: Brill, 2015). For the enduring influence of Neoplatonism on 
Renaissance literary theory, even after the rediscovery of Aristotle’s Poetics, see Michael J. B. Allen, 
“Renaissance Neoplatonism,” in Cambridge History of Literary Criticism, ed. Norton, 435–41. While 
it is outside the scope of this article to fully investigate Neoplatonic usage of hamartia in translations 
and commentaries from the period, this tradition certainly played an important role for early modern 
commentators of the Poetics, and its influence in this regard merits further study.
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because of some error [hamartia], and who is one of those people with a 
great reputation and good fortune.16
In the next chapter, Aristotle details the four types of possible incidents 
that can arouse dread or compassion in the audience and lists these from worst 
to best: 1) the protagonist may have full knowledge of an event and not do a 
certain deed, 2) the protagonist may have full knowledge of an event and still 
do the deed, 3) the protagonist may do the deed, but be ignorant of a certain 
relationship (as in the case of Oedipus and his father), or 4) the protagonist may 
be about to do a deadly deed in ignorance, but recognizes a friendly relationship 
before acting.17 Aristotle’s emphasis when describing these possibilities is on the 
relative ignorance or knowledge of the tragic protagonist and on the dramatic 
effect of acting (or refraining from action) on the basis of such knowledge. 
Indeed, most scholars now concur that Aristotle’s concept of hamartia in the 
Poetics was tied to ignorance on the part of the protagonist.18
16. Aristotle, Poetics, trans. and ed. Richard Janko (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1987), 1453a7–10. 
I have opted to use Janko’s translation in this article rather than the standard English translation by 
Ingram Bywater included in the revised Oxford translation of The Complete Works of Aristotle, edited 
by Jonathan Barnes. While Bywater’s 1909 translation is valuable, and has been revised in light of 
Rudolf Kassel’s 1965 critical edition of the Poetics, Janko’s translation bases itself on Kassel while also 
incorporating material from two manuscripts of the Poetics that have been given greater prominence 
since Bywater’s translation and Kassel’s critical edition (MS B and a medieval translation of the text into 
Arabic). This new translation also includes more detailed notes concerning the comments of medieval 
copyists and is notable for its clarity and stylistic elegance. See Janko, “Introduction,” in Poetics, xxii. The 
most recent critical edition of Aristotle’s text, which replaces Kassel’s, is Leonardo Tarán and Dimitri 
Gutas, Aristotle Poetics: Editio Maior of the Greek Text with Historical Introductions and Philological 
Commentaries (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2012).
17. Aristotle, Poetics, 1453a26–36. While Aristotle does not explicitly associate the deed mentioned in 
chapter 14 with the hamartia mentioned one chapter prior, such an association may be implied from 
context.
18. A recent study of hamartia in the Poetics convincingly defines the term as meaning “ignorance 
of particulars” when committing a specific action. See Ho Kim, “Aristotle’s ‘Hamartia’ Reconsidered,” 
Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 105 (2010): 33–52. A range of earlier scholarship also arrived 
at similar definitions, demonstrating that the common idea of the “tragic character flaw” does not 
find justification in the text of Aristotle’s Poetics. See Leon Golden, “Hamartia, Ate, and Oedipus,” The 
Classical World 72.1 (1978): 3–12; T. C. W. Stinton, “Hamartia in Aristotle and Greek Tragedy,” The 
Classical Quarterly 25.2 (1975): 221–54; R. D. Dawe, “Some Reflections on Ate and Hamartia,” Harvard 
Studies in Classical Philology 72 (1968): 89–123, doi:10.2307/311076; and Robert R. Dyer, “ ‘Hamartia’ 
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As Lurje has shown, the concept of hamartia had a marked impact on the 
reception of Sophocles’s Oedipus Tyrannus, as thinkers throughout the early 
modern period and beyond searched for what constituted the protagonist’s 
guilt: whether killing his father and sleeping with his mother were simple 
mistakes committed in ignorance, or whether they reflected flaws in Oedipus’s 
character.19 The question was a vexed one, as the first answer would indicate a 
fatalistic tragedy where the Delphic oracle’s prediction to Laius would come true 
regardless of circumstances, creating a tragedy that might move an audience to 
pity and fear but would not be morally instructive, while the second possibility 
allowed for moral instruction but required the audience to ignore the prediction 
of the oracle, and was inconsistent with Aristotelian virtue ethics.20 In spite of 
the value of Lurje’s scholarship, his work is strongly polemic; his treatment of 
sixteenth-century readings of Aristotle’s Poetics is entirely in a negative key, 
lamenting the interpretive tradition under the “dark star” of Robortello’s 
misinterpretation, and more broadly, the “bleak” history of interpretation of 
Oedipus prior to the work of late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century 
classical philologists.21 Such a teleological emphasis ignores the complex 
interpretation of hamartia advanced by critics such as Castelvetro, and fails to 
inquire about the cultural domestication and interpretive creativity present in 
such commentaries.22 Other recent work on sixteenth-century interpretations 
of hamartia includes Enrico Mattioda’s analysis of Piero Vettori’s approach to 
hamartia as an attempt to save classical drama from accusations of heretical 
in the ‘Poetics’ and Aristotle’s Model of Failure,” Arion: A Journal of Humanities and the Classics 4.4 
(1965): 658–64. Though dated, Bremer’s monographic study on hamartia remains indispensable, as 
does Suzanne Saïd’s La Faute Tragique (Paris: Maspero, 1978).
19. Lurje, Die Suche nach der Schuld, 28–65.
20. Lurje, “Facing up to Tragedy,” 449.
21. When discussing the interpretation of hamartia in Italy, Lurje claims that the exegetical activity of 
the Italian commentators was “von vornherein unter einem schlechten Stern” (ill-fated from the outset) 
due to Robortello’s problematic definition of hamartia “per imprudentiam”; later, Lurje condemns 
the centuries of interpretation prior to the work of Ulrich Wilamowitz-Moellendorff as “trostlose 
Deutungsgeschichte” (dismal interpretation history), in Lurje, Die Suche nach der Schuld, 108, 241–42.
22. When discussing sixteenth-century interpretations of catharsis, Lurje condemns the moralizing 
interpretations of Bernardo Segni, Vincenzo Maggi, and others as “scarcely founded” and “highly 
eclectic”; Castelvetro is summarily dismissed as one to whom nothing was sacred, in Die Suche nach 
der Schuld, 19–21, 88–89.
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fatalism.23 Additionally, Davide Messina has studied the influence of the Poetics 
upon Niccolò Machiavelli’s Il Principe.24 
While scholars such as Lurje and Weinberg have emphasized an increasing 
tendency to moralize the Poetics in late sixteenth-century commentaries, with 
respect to the concept of hamartia, such moralization does not appear to have 
occurred as evenly as has been assumed. Hamartia was translated as both 
peccato and errore in sixteenth-century commentaries, yet peccato was rarely 
used to suggest a religious interpretation of hamartia. Nevertheless, the use 
of peccato combined with the interpretation of hamartia by recourse to the 
Nicomachean Ethics led to an increasing emphasis on the role of the protagonist’s 
23. Enrico Mattioda, “La discussione sulla colpa tragica nelle interpretazioni della Poetica di Aristotele 
tra XVI e XVIII Secolo,” Horizonte 12 (2011): 33–50. Mattioda interprets the increasing emphasis 
in mid-century discussions of hamartia on imprudence and ignorance as evidence of literature’s 
autonomy from theological dogma during the Counter-Reformation. The centrality of Aristotle’s 
Poetics for discussions of literary theory, he argues, furnished critics with a classical authority to whom 
they could appeal when faced with critiques from the Catholic theologians. While it is true that one 
could accuse Greek tragedies, such as Sophocles’s Oedipus Rex, of fatalism—particularly in Giovanni 
Andrea dell’Anguillara’s 1565 rendition—such accusations appear to have been quite rare in the early 
Cinquecento. Indeed, Mattioda only cites one instance in a 1550 letter from the Sicilian theologian 
Giorgio Siculo which refers to Protestant beliefs of predestination as “per via di tragedia.” Moreover, 
Mattioda does not discuss the Canace controversy where—despite the intervention of the Gods—the 
most shocking aspect of the play appears to be the willingly incestuous coupling of brother and sister.
24. Davide Messina, in “L’arco Tragico del Principe: Machiavelli e l’intrigo poetico,” Italian Studies 71.3 
(July, 2016): 287–310. doi:10.1080/00751634.2016.11189248, links Machiavelli’s Principe to the tragic 
genre, and therefore with Aristotelian hamartia, based on a noted passage in Machiavelli’s letter to 
Guicciardini (October, 1525). The article overlooks contemporary readings of the Poetics by humanists 
such as Poliziano who was uninterested in matters of genre (see Peter Godman, “Poliziano’s Poetics and 
Literary History,” Interpres 13 (1993): 110–209, and From Poliziano to Machiavelli: Florentine Humanism 
in the High Renaissance (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), 31–79). Nor does the article 
discuss the problematic gap between the 1498 Latin paraphrase of the Poetics by Giorgio Valla and the 
broader appeal of the text in the 1540s and 1550s, making the bold claim that Machiavelli was a pioneer 
of genre theory—a later mid-century development—with little supporting evidence or refutation of 
existing scholarship on the generic identity of Il Principe, such as that provided by Robert Hariman, 
“No Superficial Attractions and Ornaments: The Invention of Modernity in Machiavelli’s Realist Style,” 
in Political Style: The Artistry of Power (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 13–49. More 
problematic, however, is the article’s unsupported claim that the manuscript of William of Moerbeke’s 
Latin translation was available to Machiavelli and his contemporaries (10), while current scholarship on 
the Poetics agrees that Moerbeke’s translation was lost, rediscovered in 1895, and only attributed to the 
author several decades later. See Tarán and Gutas, 43, 65, and especially 69.
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will in committing the tragic error, and thus the question of whether he or she 
deserved forgiveness.
Hamartia: a tragic sin?
What did it mean to translate hamartia with peccatum/peccato in sixteenth-
century Italy, a period when the Protestant and Catholic Reformations were 
engaged in heated debates over theological issues? The discussions on original 
sin from the fifth session of the Council of Trent provide contemporary 
perspectives on sin. This session resulted in a decree issued on 17 June 1546 
that re-affirmed the church’s position on the issue.25 While the decree itself 
does not provide a clear definition of sin, two seventeenth-century accounts 
of the Council do: Pietro Soave’s Historia del Concilio Tridentino (1619, 
pseudonymously published under the name of Paolo Sarpi) and Pietro Sforza 
Pallavicino’s orthodox rebuttal, the Istoria del Concilio di Trento (1656–57). 
Both accounts are partisan, yet agree that the theologians present at this 
session concurred in their definition of sin as entailing concupiscence and the 
voluntary disobedience of a divine law.26 This position is summarized in Sarpi’s 
account by the Dominican theologian Fra Ambrosio Catarino: “non si è mai 
inteso nella Chiesa, peccato esser altro, che l’attione volontaria contra la legge” 
25. Canones, et decreta sacrosancti oecumenici, et generalis concilii Tridentini (Rome: apud Paulum 
Manutium, Aldi F., 1564), xxiii–xxx. See also John O’Malley, Trent: What Happened at the Council 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013), 102–06.
26. Pietro Soave [Paolo Sarpi], Historia del Concilio tridentino (London: Giovanni Billio, 1619), 169; 
Pietro Sforza Pallavicino, Istoria del Concilio di Trento (Rome: Angelo Bernabó dal Verme Erede del 
Manelfi, 1656), 643 (7.10). On the reliability of Sarpi’s account and the importance of Pallavicino’s Istoria 
in Catholic circles, see Owen Chadwick, Catholicism and History: The Opening of the Vatican Archives, 
the Herbery Hensley Lectures in the University of Oxford, 1976 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1978), 47–48. For a recent reassessment of Sarpi as a historian and political philosopher see Jaska 
Kainulainen, Paolo Sarpi: A Servant of God and State (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2014), 254–55. For a 
succinct summary of the historiography of the Council, including the important roles played by Sarpi 
and Pallavicino’s accounts, see Nelson H. Minnich, “Councils of the Catholic Reformation: A Historical 
Survey,” in The Church, the Councils and Reform: The Legacy of the Fifteenth Century, ed. Christopher M. 
Bellitto (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2008), 27–59, 53–55.
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(within the church, sin has never been understood as anything other than a 
voluntary action against the law).27 
These definitions reflect the most basic understanding of sin expressed in 
Augustine’s Contra Faustum as “any transgression in deed, or word, or desire, 
of the eternal law.”28 As Paula Fredriksen has noted, however, early Christian 
interpretations of sin differed widely.29 For Paul, sin was a cosmic agent that 
defined the human condition, held everyone in its power (Romans 3:9), and was 
the root cause of a conflict between the mind which “serves the law of God” and 
the flesh which “serves the law of sin” (Romans 7:25).30 Several centuries later, 
Augustine would come to emphasize the notion of original sin and the damage 
effected by the Fall on the human will, internalizing the Pauline dichotomy 
to posit a defective and divided will which, despite its recognition of what is 
right, nevertheless desires other things, memorably summarized in the prayer 
for celibacy in book 8 of the Confessions: “grant me chastity and continence, but 
not yet.”31 Augustine’s discussion of the defective will in committing sin raises 
the question of akrasia (ἀκρασία), the problem whereby one may know the best 
course of action, but nevertheless not follow it. For Socrates in Plato’s Protogoras, 
true akrasia was not possible, as no actor would willingly pursue what they 
truly knew to be harmful, while for Aristotle in book 7 of the Nicomachean 
Ethics, akrasia was possible if due to a perceptual error; in both cases, bad 
actions were ultimately rooted in the intellect or perception rather than in the 
27. Sarpi, 171. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are mine, and punctuation in all Latin and 
Italian quotations has been modernized. While Pallavicino does not mention this specific comment, 
he also highlights the link between sin and voluntary action, when objecting to Sarpi’s depiction of 
the dismissal of Franciscan positions on penitence: “la colpa volontariamente contratta non si rimette 
finch’ella non cessa di rimaner volontaria; il che aviene per mezzo del pentimento” (the guilt that results 
from voluntary action is not resolved until it ceases to be voluntary; which occurs through penitence), 
Pallavicino, 1116 (12.12).
28. Augustine, Reply to Faustus the Manichean, trans. Richard Stothert, in Nicene and Post-Nicene 
Fathers, Augustine, 8 vols. (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1974), 4:155–345, 283.
29. Paula Fredriksen, Sin: The Early History of an Idea (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012), 
93.
30. Fredriksen, 34–35.
31. Fredriksen, 118; Augustine, Confessions, trans. Henry Chadwick (Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1991), 8.7.17. 
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will.32 For Augustine, however, as T. D. J. Chappell underlines, akrasia is not 
only possible but exists as a “fully voluntary action” of willful wrongdoing, and 
is “therefore culpable, even if it is not rationally explicable.”33 With regard to 
Augustine’s notion of the divided will, J. Caleb Clanton suggests that akrasia 
and akratic sins occur in the temporal period “between the cognitive effects of 
divine illumination and the full volitional transformation brought on by God’s 
grace,” or, in other words, in an agent’s “post-grace perversio,” as Augustine 
discusses with reference to his old and new wills in book 8, chapter 5 of his 
Confessions.34 Augustine’s interpretation of the divided will had a profound 
impact on later thinkers, and would famously lead Martin Luther to write in 
the preface of his commentary on Paul’s Letter to the Romans that sin “means 
not only the outward works of the body, but [also] the inmost heart, with all its 
powers”; the defective nature of the will implied that man could not be justified 
through good works, but only through faith (sola fide).35 The Tridentine and 
post-Tridentine church rejected such a view, relying instead on the positive 
interpretations of human will expressed by Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus, 
key theologians of the Dominican and Franciscan orders respectively.36 
32. Plato, Protogoras, trans. W. K. C. Guthrie, in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, ed. Edith Hamilton 
and Huntington Cairns (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 308–52, 349 (358c–d); 
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. W. D. Ross, rev. J. O. Urmson, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, 
ed. Jonathan Barnes, 2 vols. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 2:1729–1869, 2:1809–12 
(1145b21–1147b20). For an excellent collection of recent studies on akrasia in Greek thought, see 
Christopher Bobonich and Pierre Destrée, eds., Akrasia in Greek Philosophy: From Socrates to Plotinus 
(Leiden: Brill, 2007). 
33. T. D. J. Chappell, Aristotle and Augustine on Freedom: Two Theories of Freedom, Voluntary Action, 
and Akrasia (London: Macmillan, 1995), 206–07. 
34. J. Caleb Clanton, “Teaching Socrates, Aristotle, and Augustine on Akrasia,” Religions 6 (2015): 
419–33, 429–31; Augustine, Confessions, 8.5. For an extensive discussion of the role of akrasia in 
Augustine, and its impact on Augustinian notions of the will and freedom (particularly with reference 
to Confessions 8.10), see Risto Saarinen, Weakness of the Will in Medieval Thought: From Augustine to 
Buridan (Leiden: Brill, 1994), 20–42.
35. Martin Luther, Commentary on Romans, trans. J. Theodore Mueller (Grand Rapids, MI: Kregel 
Classics, 1976), xv. For a thorough discussion of akrasia in Renaissance thought, including Italian 
humanism, the Lutheran Reformation, and the Calvinist Reformation, see Risto Saarinen, Weakness of 
the Will in Renaissance and Reformation Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
36. As John W. O’Malley has noted, Aquinas’s emphasis on the goodness of “the natural” was achieved 
through the application of Aristotelian metaphysical theory of matter and form to the body–soul 
relationship. See O’Malley, “Trent, Sacred Images, and Catholics’ Senses of the Sensuous,” in The 
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It is doubtful that sixteenth-century commentators and translators 
of the Poetics had such complex theological definitions of peccato in mind 
when discussing hamartia. While few poetic theorists of the period were also 
theologians, linguistic sources from the late sixteenth and early seventeenth 
centuries confirm the religious significance of the term. The Vocabolario degli 
accademici della Crusca (1612) defines peccato along the same lines as the 
Tridentine theologians: as a voluntary action that violates God’s law.37 Yet, the 
Vocabolario also indicates that peccato may be used in a more general sense 
to indicate a fault or a defect (equivalent to the Latin vitium or menda), citing 
examples of such usage in the works of both Boccaccio and Petrarca.38 These 
two uses of peccato are also reflected in John Florio’s 1598 Italian-English 
dictionary, where the term is defined as “a sin, a fault, an offence, a crime, a 
trespasse.”39 A variety of non-theological uses of the term are also reflected 
in Florio’s definition of the verb peccare: “to sinne, to trespasse, to offend, to 
commit a fault, to faile in something, to do amisse, not to do what we ought, to 
swarve from the law.”40 Was the lexical choice between rendering hamartia as 
peccato or as errore in sixteenth-century commentaries on the Poetics simply a 
matter of style or was it indicative of a spiritual interpretation of Aristotle’s text? 
Translating Hamartia in Sixteenth-Century Italy
For literary critics and commentators in sixteenth-century Italy, hamartia was 
a term that could be translated in several different ways. In Alessando Pazzi 
de’ Medici’s 1536 translation, the hamartia passage from Poetics 1453a7–10 is 
rendered as follows:
Sensuous in the Counter-Reformation Church, ed. Marcia B. Hall and Tracy E. Cooper (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013), 28–48, 40.
37. “Peccato è ogni detto, e fatto e ogni cosa disiderata contr’alla legge di Dio […] che cosa è il peccato, 
se non un trapassamento della legge d’Iddio, e disubbidienza de’ comandamenti celestiali,” Vocabolario 
degli Accademici della Crusca (Venice: Giovanni Alberti, 1612), 603.
38. “E generalmente per difetto, e mancamento” (Vocabolario, 603).
39. John Florio, A Worlde of Wordes, or Most Copious and Exact Dictionarie in Italian and English 
(London: Arnold Hatfield for Edw. Blount, 1598), 263.
40. Florio, 263. We may detect an echo of the Tridentine theologians’ definition in Florio’s reference to 
“swerving from the law.” 
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[R]eliquum est, ut ad haec maxime idoneus is habeatur, qui medius inter 
tales sit. Is autem erit qui nec virtute, nec iustitia antecellat minimeque per 
vicium pravitatemque in ipsam infelicitatem lapsus fuerit, verum humano 
quodam errore, ex magna quidem existimatione atque felicitate.
(Finally, the most suitable person for this purpose [for tragic plots] should 
be considered to be the one who stands between two such men. He will be 
one who does not surpass others in virtue nor in justice. Also, he should 
not fall through great vice into unhappiness, but rather should fall from 
great reputation and happiness due to some human error.)41
Following Giorgio Valla’s partial 1498 Latin translation of the Poetics, Pazzi 
renders hamartia as “humanus quidam error.”42 Pazzi’s addition of the adjective 
humanus to describe this error is worth noting as it implies the protagonist’s 
agency and human fallibility, an implication that had a marked impact in later 
discussions.
41. Aristotle, Aristotelis Poetica per Alexandrum Paccium… in latinum conversa… (Venice: Aldus 
Manutius and Andrea Torresani di Asolo, 1536), 31. For a discussion of this translation and its importance 
for sixteenth-century commentaries, see Weinberg, A History of Literary Criticism, 1:361–73. See also 
Bryan Brazeau, “no.33 Alessandro Pazzi de’ Medici, Aristotelis Poetica…,” in Venezia e Aristotele (ca. 
1450–1600): Greco, Latino, e Italiano (exhibition catalogue), ed. Alessio Cotugno and David A. Lines 
(Venice: Marcianum Press, 2016), 102–03.
42. Valla renders the passage as follows: “inter hos reliquum est sane is, qui neque virtute excellit et 
iusticia neque vitio et improbitate mutet in fortunam adversam, sed errore aliquo eorum” (Between those 
men that are left, there is reasonably that one who is preeminent neither in virtue nor in justice, and 
does not fall into misfortune by vice and wickedness, but on account of some error of his). In Rhetorica 
aristotelis cum Egidii de Roma … commentariis … addita eiusdem aristotelis Poetica, cum averroys in 
eandem Summa novissime recognita cunctisque erroribus castigate (Venice: Giorgio Arrivabene, 1515), 
4. The text contains a reprint of Valla’s 1498 Latin paraphrase along with Hermannus Alemannus’s 
1256 translation of Averroes’s commentary. As Javitch observes, Valla’s paraphrase of the text seems to 
have held little interest for contemporary readers in the early Cinquecento; in Valla’s own De poetica, 
Aristotle is cited “only occasionally and mostly for his views on the origins of drama.” See Javitch, “The 
assimilation of Aristotle’s Poetics,” 55. Valla’s interest in the Poetics seems to be rather similar to that 
of his contemporary, Angelo Poliziano, whose interest in the Poetics has been described by Godman 
as filtered through an “Alexandrian optic” that emphasized literary history (the names of poets, their 
compositions, and protagonists) and paid little attention to elements of literary form. See Godman, 
From Poliziano to Machiavelli, 60–65, and “Poliziano’s Poetics.”
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Interpretations of hamartia in the 1540s were not limited to commentaries 
and translations of the Poetics. The concept also played an important role in 
mid-sixteenth-century poetic debates, such as the one surrounding La Canace 
(1546). Authored by the Paduan humanist Sperone Speroni and read at the 
Accademia degli Infammati in Padua in 1542, this tragedy depicts the incestuous 
love between a brother and a sister who are led into the act by Venus.43 The 
controversy was ignited by an anonymous polemic dialogue, the Giudizio d’una 
tragedia di Canace e Macareo, which was published in 1550 (despite internal 
dating from 1543).44 The work is heavily informed by Aristotelian poetic 
tenets. Hamartia and the moral character of the ideal tragic protagonist are 
two key problems debated at the very beginning of the Giudizio. Speroni’s play 
is condemned by the dialogue character Lodovico Boccadiferro on account of 
its lack of efficacy; if the tragic protagonists are simply immoral, he claims, the 
audience will be unable to identify with them and their punishment will thus 
induce neither fear nor pity.45 The crucial problem underlined at the outset of 
the Giudizio is thus not the incestuous coupling of brother and sister, nor the 
fatalism of the act’s motivation by a pagan goddess; rather, it is the fact that 
Canace and Macareo lay together willingly, with full understanding of their 
familial relationship.
A short while later in the dialogue, Boccadiferro explains why the incest 
plot in Sophocles’s Oedipus functions as an effective tragic element, and why 
the play’s eponymous protagonist is of appropriate moral character: 
[Q]uello che potria essere di scelerato nella Tragedia non venne per 
scienza e volontà e consentimento o di Giocasta o di Edipo, ma per errore; 
43. For a discussion of Speroni’s relationship with the Accademia degli Infiammati, see Francesco Bruni, 
“Sperone Speroni e l’Accademia degli Infiammati,” Filologia e letteratura 13 (1967): 24–71. Concerning 
Speroni’s role in Padua and his influence on Alessandro Piccolomini, see Eugenio Refini, Per via 
d’annotationi: le glosse inedite di Alessandro Piccolomini all’Ars poetica di Orazio (Lucca: M. Pacini 
Fazzi, 2009), 55–56.
44. An overview of the Canace controversy is provided by Weinberg, A History of Literary Criticism, 
2:912–53. There is evidence to suggest that the Giudizio was circulating in manuscript throughout the 
mid-to-late 1540s and that its author was Giambattista Giraldi Cinzio, the famed Ferrarese poet and 
dramatist. See Christina Roaf, ed., Canace, e scritti in sua difesa; Giudizio ed Epistola latina (Bologna: 
Commisione per i testi di lingua, 1982), x–xv. See also Roaf, “A Sixteenth Century Anonimo: the Author 
of the Giuditio Sopra la Tragedia di Canace e Macareo,” in Italian Studies 14 (1959): 49–74.
45. Roaf, Canace, 98. Emphasis mine.
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perché Giocasta non conosceva Edipo per figliuolo, né Edipo Giocasta per 
madre.46
(Whatever aspects of wickedness there may be in the tragedy do not occur 
through the knowledge, will, and consent of either Jocasta or Oedipus, but 
rather through error. Jocasta did not know Oedipus to be her son, nor did 
Oedipus recognize Jocasta as his mother.) 
Tragic hamartia thus seems to be understood as a mistake of fact, and is translated 
as errore, following Valla and Pazzi. The author of the Giudizio, however, adds 
a new emphasis on the role of the will. Voluntary actions committed in full 
knowledge (as in the case of Canace and Macareo) are opposed to involuntary 
tragic actions committed in ignorance (Oedipus). While Aristotle’s discussion 
of hamartia in the Poetics emphasized knowledge or ignorance of the tragic 
action and the different plots this made possible, Boccadiferro’s perspective 
in the Giudizio adds a volitional element to Aristotle’s definition of the tragic 
error. Elsewhere in the Giudizio, participants in the dialogue will use the term 
peccato, such as when il Fiorentino later returns to a discussion of Oedipus’s 
crimes. Yet, the term is used with reference to ignorance, arguing that the 
ignorance of one’s sins excuses wickedness and makes a protagonist worthy of 
pity and compassion: 
La qual cosa non ha voluto alcuno de’ buoni autori che fusse mai in 
Edipo; anzi hanno finto che ‘l miser si congiunse colla madre non di 
propria volontà ma oltre ogni suo pensiero, e questo solo per farlo atto a 
Tragedia, il che non avria potuto avvenire (volendo far nascere sopra di lui 
la compassione) se senza riguardo alcuno si fusse colla madre congiunto; 
ma l’ignoranza del suo peccato ha levato da lui ogni sceleraggine e l’ha fatto 
degnissimo di compassione.47
(No good authors ever wanted Oedipus to have this trait; rather, they 
pretend that the poor man lay with his mother, not of his own will but 
beyond any of his knowledge, and this was only done to make him 
46. Roaf, Canace, 100. Emphasis mine.
47. Roaf, Canace, 124.
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appropriate for Tragedy (wishing to make him provoke compassion). This 
could not have occurred if he had slept with his mother without a care in 
the world; but the ignorance of his sin forgives him of any wickedness and 
makes him worthy of compassion.) 
The Giudizio thus bears witness to the cultural translation of hamartia as 
peccato, coupled with a new emphasis on voluntary action; ignorance of 
particular knowledge leads to an action that is not accompanied by the will 
and is therefore worthy of compassion. Later commentators would not only 
adopt the term peccato but would also return to the themes of the protagonist’s 
ignorance and volition.48
Hamartia as peccatum in Latin commentaries: involuntary action, 
ignorance, and imprudence
Francesco Robortello’s 1548 Explicationes was the first sustained commentary 
on Aristotle’s Poetics produced in early modern Italy, and its translation of 
hamartia as peccatum would have a profound impact on later interpretations.49 
48. Several translators and commentators retained Pazzi’s translation of hamartia as error rather than 
peccatum. The Florentine Bernardo Segni reverted to the Italian errore in the first vernacular translation 
of the Poetics (1559). So, too, did Antonio Minturno, a humanist bishop who served on the Council of 
Trent, referring to hamartia as an “error quidam humano” in his Latin treatise De poeta (1559) and later 
in his Italian treatise L’Arte poetica (1563) as “humano errore.” Yet, these examples were the exception. 
Hamartia was increasingly translated with peccatum/peccato and accompanied by a growing emphasis 
on the will of the tragic protagonist in this act. See Bernardo Segni, Rettorica e Poetica d’Aristotile tradotte 
di greco in lingua vulgare fiorentina (Florence: Lorenzo Torrentino, 1549), 306–07; Antonio Minturno, 
De poeta (Venice: Franciscus Rampazetus, 1559), 180, and L’Arte poetica, nella quale si contengono i 
precetti heroici, tragici, comici, satyrici, e d’ogni altra Poesia: con la dottrina de sonetti, canzoni, et ogni 
sorte di rime thoscane (Venice: Valvassori, 1563), 78. For a discussion of Minturno’s commentary and its 
context, see Weinberg, A History of Literary Criticism, 2:737–44.
49. Robortello taught Latin and Greek in various Italian universities in the 1530s and 1540s—in Lucca, 
Venice, Bologna, and elsewhere—before settling in Padua, which was a key site for the development of 
poetic debates in the period. Robortello’s commentary on the Poetics is discussed at length in Weinberg, A 
History of Literary Criticism, 1:66–68 and 1:388–406. For a succinct discussion of Robortello’s biography 
and academic career, along with how these may have impacted his interpretation of the Poetics, see 
Déborah Blocker, “Elucider et équivoquer: Francesco Robortello (ré)invente la catharsis,” in Stratégies 
de l’équivoque, ed. J.-P. Cavaillé, special issue, Cahiers du Centre de Recherches Historiques 33 (2004): 
109–40. Also useful is Paul F. Grendler, The Universities of the Italian Renaissance (Baltimore: Johns 
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Robortello retains Pazzi’s Latin translation of the passage in question, 
describing hamartia as “humanus quidam error,” but changes error to peccatum 
in his commentary.
Quaerendum igitur est, qualis hic sit. Ac plane inter bonum ac malum 
is est collocandus, qui peccat quidem, sed imprudens peccat; huiusmodi 
enim neque bonus appellandus, quia iam peccavit; neque rursus malus, 
quia non consulto peccavit, sed per imprudentiam. 
(Therefore it ought to be asked, “what kind of person is this [ideal tragic 
protagonist]?” And plainly he is placed between good and bad, who sins, 
but sins imprudently; for indeed such a man ought not to be called good, 
because he sinned at that time; nor on the other hand ought he to be called 
evil, because he did not sin on purpose but through imprudence.)
Robortello then refers to Aristotle’s Ethics and the philosopher’s distinction 
between voluntary and involuntary acts to make sense of hamartia later in the 
same section:
Aristoteles libro tertio Ethicorum, omnia quae homines agunt, aut 
voluntaria esse, aut non voluntaria appelanda. Voluntaria sunt, quae ἐκ 
τῶη προαιερεσεῶη idest ab electione proveniunt. Non voluntaria sunt 
ea, quae aliquis invitus facit: atque sane invitius videtur agere aliquid 
tribus modis, aut vi coactus; aut ignoratione & imprudentia adductus; 
aut metu maioris alicuius mali […] Qui vero per ignorantionem agit, scit 
quidem quid aequum, quid oportet; imprudenter tamen, & invitus agit. 
Hic quidem particulare ignorat, quod agit, ut Oedipus, qui peremit Laium 
patrem, sciebat enim nefas esse perimere patrem; sed ignorabat illum esse 
patrem. Hi quidem igitur, qui per imprudentiam peccant, excusatione, & 
commiseratione digni, ut idem ait Aristoteles libro tertio Ethicorum sub 
initium, his verbis. ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς ἀκουσίοις συγγνώμης, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ἐλέου, 
τὸ ἑκούσιον. Si igitur huiusmodi commiseratione digna patet referri posse 
Hopkins University Press, 2002), 229–39. A detailed yet possibly unreliable biography of Robortello is 
found in Gian Giuseppe Liruti, Notizie delle vite ed opere scritte da letterati del Friuli, 4 vols. (Venice and 
Udine, 1760–1830; repr. in 2 vols., Bologna: Forni, 1971), 2:413–83. Citations refer to the 1971 edition.
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ad tragoediam, quae eam perturbationem in primis studet excitare in 
animis auditorum.50
(Aristotle in the third book of the ethics [says that] all things which men 
do ought either to be called voluntary or involuntary. Those things are 
voluntary which are chosen or willed, that is which come from choice. 
Non-voluntary [acts] are those things which someone does against his 
will: and reasonably it seems that something is done against our will in 
these three ways, either 1) [being] compelled by force, or 2) having been 
persuaded by ignorance and imprudence, or 3) by fear of some greater 
evil. […] But he who acts on account of ignorance, indeed knows what 
is just and what is necessary; nevertheless he acts carelessly and against 
his will. Indeed this man ignores the particular element of what he does, 
just as Oedipus who killed Laius his father, for he knew it was an impious 
act to kill his father; but he did not know that that man was his father. 
So these men, therefore, who sin through ignorance are worthy of being 
excused and pitied, as Aristotle likewise says in the third book of the Ethics 
after the beginning with these words: those [actions] that are involuntary 
are condoned, and sometimes even pitied. Therefore, if such actions are 
worthy of pity, it is possible that [this] may be referred to as tragedy, which 
chiefly seeks to excite that emotion [i.e., pity] in the souls of spectators.)
Robortello has expanded upon the volitional element of hamartia suggested 
in the Giudizio, defining it with reference to Aristotle’s Ethics. While Lurje has 
described Robortello’s coupling of imprudentia and ignorantia as a confusion 
of terms, the Paduan humanist’s use of syntactic dittology can be explained 
with reference to Aristotelian ethics.51 In book 6 of the Nicomachean Ethics, 
Aristotle qualifies prudence (φρόνεσις) as being concerned not only with 
50. Robortello, 131. 
51. Lurje notes how Robortello chooses the Ciceronian term imprudentia as a more elegant, albeit 
misleading, equivalence of ignorantia. Indeed, Robortello frequently describes hamartia as an error 
committed “per imprudentiam et ignorantiam,” while later authors will break his use of hendiadys, 
privileging one term over the other. See Lurje, Die Suche nach der Schuld, 84–85. See particularly 84n15 
for a rich list of examples detailing Robortello’s usage of these terms in his commentary.
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general principles, but also with particular facts.52 An imprudent action, then, 
is one that ignores particular facts but may still observe general principles. Yet, 
Robortello’s reference to particular facts may equally reflect another passage of 
Aristotle’s Ethics: the discussion of akrasia in book 7. While Plato had denied 
the possibility of full akrasia, noting that it was primarily an intellectual error 
made in ignorance of true knowledge, Aristotle responds that we are still left 
with the phenomenon that many act in the opposite way of what they believe 
to be the good. Thus, Aristotle posits that such behaviour occurs not because of 
ignorance of universal knowledge but rather because of a perceptual error. As 
Clanton notes, he frames this deliberation as a tripartite practical syllogism: “1) 
universal premise = “Everything sweet must be tasted”; 2) particular premise 
= “This particular thing here is sweet”; 3) conclusion (assuming the agent is 
free and rational) = [“This must be tasted”].”53 The akratic person then may 
still be in possession of full knowledge of the right path of action, but makes 
a perceptual error by ignoring or incorrectly applying the particular premise 
(i.e., in the example above, assuming a lemon to be a sweet fruit). By shifting 
the problem of akrasia from the intellect to the realm of perception, Aristotle 
is able to explain how agents may act against their own better judgment by 
comparing the akratic agent to one influenced by passion: 
But now this is just the condition of men under the influence of passions; 
for outbursts of anger and sexual appetites and some other such passions, 
it is evident, actually alter our bodily condition, and in some men even 
produce fits of madness. It is plain, then, that incontinent [akratic] people 
must be said to be in a similar condition to these.54
52. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. W. D. Ross, rev. J. O. Urmson, in The Complete Works of 
Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes, 2 vols. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 2:1729–1869, 
2:1802 (1141b14–16).
53. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 7.3, 1812 (1147a1–30); Clanton, 423.
54. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 7.3, 1812 (1147a14–19). More recently, Nancy Sherman has noted the 
similarities between explanations of hamartia as “mistake of fact” and akrasia, while also remarking on 
the unsatisfactory explanations of both, as neither elucidates the link between ignorance or misperception 
and “aspects of character, such as belief, desire, emotion, and memory.” See Nancy Sherman, “Hamartia 
and Virtue,” in Essays on Aristotle’s Poetics, ed. Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1992), 177–96, 179.
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Thus, for Robortello, Oedipus’s ignorance could be described in terms 
of Aristotle’s treatment of akrasia (“Indeed this man ignores the particular 
element of what he does, just as Oedipus who killed Laius his father, for he knew 
it was an impious act to kill his father; but he did not know that that man was 
his father”). For Robortello, then, both an imprudent action (committed in 
ignorance of particular facts) and an action committed in ignorance ultimately 
appear to be non-voluntary actions, worthy of being excused and pitied, and 
therefore appropriate for tragedy. Despite Robortello’s use of peccatum/peccare, 
his emphasis on the non-voluntary nature of such action seems to suggest a 
reading of hamartia through the lens of Aristotle’s discussion of akrasia, 
rather than Augustine’s.55 In this passage, Robortello also notes that those 
who “sin through imprudence” are worthy of excusatio and commiseratio. This 
emphasis on excusing the protagonist’s hamartia is also Robortello’s addition; 
whereas the Aristotelian definition of the ideal tragic protagonist claimed that 
he should induce pity and terror in the audience, Robortello has substituted 
the forgiveness of the protagonist’s sin for the terror he might inspire in the 
audience. While his discussion is rigorously Aristotelian, Robortello’s use of 
excusatio, emphasis on the will, implicit reference to Aristotle’s discussion of 
akrasia, and use of peccatum/peccare all suggest the possibility of an implicit 
Christianizing interpretation of hamartia, one that would have a profound 
impact throughout the remainder of the Cinquecento.
The term peccatum also occurs in other commentaries on the Poetics 
produced in this period. In an analogous passage from Bartolomeo Lombardi 
and Vincenzo Maggi’s 1550 Explanationes, the term appears alongside a similar 
discussion of voluntary and involuntary action, suggesting that Maggi was 
building much of his analysis upon Robortello’s:
Iam igitur apparet cuius conditionis homines Tragoediis materiam 
praestent, viri inquam illustres ac felices, hoc est, qui copiis ac imperio 
reliquos antecellunt, sed non virtute; cum non animi pravitate, sed 
ignorantia patrando scelus in infelicitatem labuntur. Quod hominum 
55. The absence of Augustinian language is significant, particularly when considered alongside the 
increasing use of Augustinian ideas in the period to interpret and, at times, harmonize Aristotelian and 
Platonic definitions of akrasia, as Saarinen notes with respect to Francesco Piccolomini’s 1583 Universa 
philosophia de moribus. See Saarinen, Weakness of the Will in Renaissance and Reformation Thought, 
101–04.
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genus inter bonos ac pravos medium esse dicit: quoniam peccantes bonos 
non appellamus. Qui vero peccant, neque ex proposito id praestant, sed 
ob imprudentiam efficiunt, mali prorius [sic] dici non debent: iccirco inter 
bonos ac pravos medii erunt.
(Now therefore it appears that men of this condition supply material for 
tragedies. I say illustrious men, and happy ones, that is those who surpass 
[others] in wealth and available power, but not in virtue; since they do not 
fall into unhappiness by depravity of soul, but by having done an evil deed 
out of ignorance. [Aristotle] says that this kind of man is in the middle 
between good and bad men; since we do not call sinners [peccantes] good. 
But those who sin and do so, not on purpose, but rather on account of 
imprudence should not be called absolutely evil: therefore they will be 
midway between good and bad people.)56
A careful reader will note that Maggi begins by describing a deed done out of 
ignorantia, and quickly shifts to one committed on account of imprudentia, 
following Robortello’s Aristotelian definition of imprudent deeds being 
committed in ignorance of particular details. Maggi expands on Robortello’s 
use of peccatum; the tragic protagonist is now qualified as peccans—a sinner—
and the ideal protagonists between good and bad men are those sinners who 
err on account of imprudence.
The third great Latin commentary on the Poetics continues Robortello 
and Maggi’s use of the term peccatum. In 1560, the Florentine philologist 
Piero Vettori provided a new translation of the Poetics along with extensive 
commentary in his 1560 Commentarii in primum librum Aristotelis de arte 
56. Maggi and Lombardi, 154, emphasis mine. A useful overview of this commentary is provided 
by Weinberg, 1:406–18. Maggi’s commentary is often read as overtly moralizing, particularly in his 
interpretation of catharsis. Despite Hathaway’s and, more recently, Eugene Ryan’s nuanced rebuttals 
of Giuseppe Toffanin’s view that Maggi’s perspective on catharsis was complicit with the demands of 
the Counter-Reformation church, this perspective of Maggi’s moralizing distortions continues to hold 
sway in more recent works, such as Enrico Bisanti, Vincenzo Maggi: Interprete tridentino della Poetica 
di Aristotele (Brescia: Ateneo di Brescia, 1991). See Giuseppe Toffanin, Il Cinquecento (Milan: Vallardi, 
1950), 489, along with rebuttals in Hathaway, 221–24; and Eugene E. Ryan, “Robortello and Maggi on 
Aristotle’s Theory of Catharsis,” Rinascimento 22 (1982): 263–74.
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poetarum.57 In his definition of hamartia, Vettori follows Robortello and Maggi 
by using the term peccatum and discussing the protagonist’s volition:
Quid autem proprie ἁμαρτία foret, docuit ipse in quaestione xxvi segmenti 
eius, quo explicat ea, quae pertinent ad harmoniam. Inquit enim: ἁμαρτία 
| δέ ἐστι τοῦ χείρονος πρᾶξις. Cum igitur aliquis relicto eo, quod facere 
praestabat, propter imprudentiam id, quod est deterius gerit, tunc labitur 
ac peccat. Exempli causa. Oedipus lapsus est quia ira commotus interfecit 
Laium: nec cognovit eum patrem esse: praestabat autem iniuriam 
eam quam acceperat ab eius satellite aequo animo ferre, nec tantopere 
excandescere.
(What however [Aristotle] specifically meant by hamartia, he teaches 
in question xxvi of the fragment, in which he explains it as that which 
pertains to harmony. For he says “hamartia is doing what is worse.” 
Therefore, when someone leaves behind that which he ought to have done, 
and commits an act for which he is responsible on account of imprudence, 
he behaves wrongly, and thereupon falls and sins. For example: Oedipus 
acted wrongly because he killed Laius when moved by rage: he did not 
know him to be his father. However, it was better for him to bear his 
injury which he received from one of his [Laius’s] attendants with a level 
head, rather than to burn up with rage.)58
Hamartia, for Vettori, is choosing the worse of two possible paths of action. 
Oedipus’s hamartia is thus linked to his inability to manage his rage. Vettori 
uses the term peccatum and even provides the steps by which such a sin 
occurs; Oedipus first receives an injury from Laius’s attendant, imprudently 
burns up with rage, and then commits murder. While Lurje and Mattioda have 
emphasized the impact of Vettori’s claim of Oedipus’s moral responsibility for 
subsequent critics, neither has remarked on how Vettori incorporates both 
Robortello’s characteristics of ignorantia and imprudentia.59 Vettori specifies 
that Oedipus “did not know him to be his father,” referring back to Robortello’s 
57. On Vettori’s commentary, see Weinberg, A History of Literary Criticism, 1:461–66. 
58. Vettori, 124.
59. Lurje, Die Suche nach der Schuld, 113–15; Mattioda, 41–42.
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emphasis on Oedipus’s ignorance of particular circumstances and reference 
to Aristotle’s explanation of akrasia via a practical syllogism.60 Yet, Vettori 
also changes Robortello’s imprudentia from ignorance of circumstances to 
an impetuous rage that takes hold of Oedipus, making explicit Robortello’s 
implicit reference to Aristotle’s discussion of akrasia as ignorance of the 
particular premise when overcome by passions due to an error in perception.61 
Vettori’s emphasis, however, on an alternative course of action for Oedipus 
suggests a volitional element that was not present in earlier commentaries. 
While Vettori’s discussion is not overtly Augustinian or Christianizing, 
hamartia is nevertheless transformed from its definition in the Poetics as an 
error committed in ignorance to a moral failure; Oedipus could not control his 
rage and thus his hamartia consists in abandoning the better path (controlling 
his anger) for the worse. 
While it may seem tempting to interpret the increased usage of peccatum, 
the discussions of voluntary and involuntary actions, and Vettori’s suggestion 
of moral responsibility in mid-century commentaries on Aristotle’s Poetics as a 
Christianization of hamartia, the appearance of peccato rather than errore does 
not appear to signal the rise of strongly-inflected religious interpretations. Such 
elements might instead be seen as an effort on the part of commentators to 
linguistically domesticate Aristotle’s text for a Christian audience. Translators 
and commentators did not ask, for example, whether a tragic protagonist’s 
hamartia was a venial or mortal sin, how it might be expiated through penance, 
or whether tragedies should represent the sacrament of confession—all of which 
were concerns of great importance to the Tridentine council. More importantly, 
despite the influence of Aristotle’s discussion of akrasia from Robortello 
onward, there appears to be no evidence of Augustinian influence, which would 
60. Robortello, 131.
61. Indeed, later in book 7, Aristotle characterizes anger due to akrasia in terms similar to Vettori’s 
description of Oedipus’s murder of Laius: “anger by reason of the warmth and hastiness of its nature, 
though it hears, does not hear an order, and springs to take revenge. For reason or imagination informs 
us that we have been insulted or slighted, and anger, reasoning as it were that anything like this must 
be fought against, boils up straightaway.” Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 2:1815 (1149a25–32). Thus, if 
Vettori is also reading hamartia through the lens of akrasia, this passage would reinforce and justify his 
interpretation by providing the practical syllogism: “Any slight or insult received must be fought against 
in order to defend one’s honour” (universal), “This man’s attendant has insulted me” (particular), “This 
man and his attendants must be attacked” (conclusion). Oedipus’s error in perception would result from 
his ignorance of a key aspect of the particular premise: namely, that “this man” is his father.
“My Own Worst Enemy”: Translating Hamartia in Sixteenth-Century Italy 35
have made it easy for a commentator to link his discussion of akrasia to the 
Christian conception of sin. Precise and strictly theological definitions of sin 
thus appear to be less relevant than the translational strategy that motivated the 
translation of hamartia as peccato. Discussions on the voluntary or involuntary 
nature of a tragic protagonist’s actions seem to have been motivated by the very 
same concerns present in the Giudizio: providing precepts for the composition 
of successful tragedies that could create the effect of catharsis through pity 
and fear. Nevertheless, despite their intentions, these commentaries laid the 
conceptual groundwork for a Christianizing interpretation of hamartia, which 
would occur in the work of Castelvetro. 
Hamartia Christianized in Castelvetro
Lodovico Castelvetro’s 1570 Poetica d’Aristotele vulgarizzata e sposta provides 
a profoundly spiritual and Christianizing interpretation of hamartia. The 
Catholic Reformation had a significant impact on Castelvetro, who fled Italy 
in 1561 after being accused of heresy for importing and distributing banned 
Protestant texts. His commentary on the Poetics was composed in Geneva and 
Lyon after his flight from the Italian peninsula, before finally being published in 
Vienna in 1570.62 In this text, Castelvetro sets himself the unique and daunting 
task of not only translating or commenting on Aristotle’s Poetics but also—
recognizing the fragmentary nature of the text—filling in the gaps with what 
Aristotle could or should have written.63 A notable example of Castelvetro’s 
procedure occurs in his comment on the hamartia passage:
62. Valerio Marchetti and Giorgio Patrizi, “Castelvetro, Ludovico,” Dizionario biografico degli Italiani, ed. 
Alberto M. Ghisalberti (Rome: Istituto dell’Enciclopedia Italiana, 1925—), vol. 22 (1979), 8–21. Available 
at treccani.it/enciclopedia/ludovico-castelvetro_(Dizionario-Biografico)/, accessed  21 December 2016. 
For an excellent overview of Castelvetro’s biography and his relationship with the Counter-Reformation 
see Stefano Jossa, “Exchanging Poetry with Theology: Ludovico Castelvetro between Humanism and 
Heresy,” in Beyond Catholicism: Heresy, Mysticism, and Apocalypse in Italian Culture, ed. Fabrizio de 
Donno and Simon Gilson (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 77–104.
63. Lodovico Castelvetro, Poetica d’Aristotele vulgarizzata e sposta, ed. Werther Romani, 2 vols. (Bari: 
Laterza, 1978), 1:2. As Weinberg notes, while his sixteenth-century predecessors were “respectful and 
subservient” toward the text of the Poetics, Castelvetro uses Aristotle both as a point of departure and 
as a theoretical opponent (Weinberg, A History of Literary Criticism, 1:503). For Castelvetro’s approach 
to the Poetics see Weinberg, A History of Literary Criticism 1:502–511; Weinberg, “Castelvetro’s Theory 
of Poetics,” in Critics and Criticism, ed. R. S. Crane (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), 
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Ma, prima che procediamo più oltre, è da por mente che Aristotele in 
questo luogo pare presupporre che Dio abbia cura speziale degli uomini 
particolari, e spezialmente degli uomini da bene, in quanto dice che non 
si deono gli uomini di santissima vita rappresentare che trapassino da 
felicità a miseria, percioché questa non sarebbe cosa né spaventevole né 
compassionevole, ma abominevole, cioè sarebbe cosa che indurrebbe gli 
uomini a credere che Dio non avesse providenza speziale de’ suoi divoti 
e che fosse ingiusto, poiché così male meritasse coloro che gli rendono il 
debito onore, permettendo che caggiano di felicità in miseria.64 
(Yet, before we continue, one must recall that in this passage Aristotle 
appears to presuppose that God takes special care of particular men, and 
especially of good men, where he says that one should not represent men 
who lead most holy lives falling from happiness into misery, because this 
would not be frightening nor pathetic, but rather abominable, that is it 
would be the sort of thing that would induce men to believe that God does 
not have special providence over his faithful and that he is unjust, since he 
rewards those who pay him due honour so poorly, allowing them to fall 
from happiness into misery.)
What in the Poetics had simply been men who excelled beyond others 
in goodness, in Castelvetro is transformed into men who lead holy lives (“di 
santissima vita”). The only danger in representing the downfall of such a man 
for Aristotle was that it was neither terrifying nor pitiable.65 Castelvetro’s 
Christianizing addition—that such a play could inspire the audience to doubt 
God’s personal providence—is noteworthy insofar as it adds spiritual and 
political dimensions to the tragic protagonist’s effect on an audience. Rather 
349–71; and Andrew Bongiorno, Castelvetro on the Art of Poetry: An Abridged Translation of Lodovico 
Castelvetro’s Poetica d’Aristotele vulgarizzata et sposta (Binghamton, NY: Medieval and Renaissance 
Texts and Studies, 1984), xiv–xix. On the relationship of Castelvetro’s commentary to earlier Cinquecento 
translations and commentaries on the Poetics, see Anna Siekiera, “La Poetica vulgarizzata e sposta per 
Lodovico Castelvetro e le traduzioni cinquecentesche del trattato di Aristotele,” in Lodovico Castelvetro: 
letterati e grammatici nella crisi religiosa del Cinquecento. Atti della XIII giornata Luigi Firpo. Torino, 
21–22 settembre 2006, ed. Massimo Firpo and Guido Mongini (Florence: Leo S. Olschki, 2008), 25–45.
64. Castelvetro, 1:361.
65. Aristotle, Poetics, 1452b35–36.
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than forbid such a representation due to lack of poetic efficacy, Castelvetro 
forbids it due to its seditious potential to foment resentment against God: 
Adunque la persona di singolare santità trapassando da felicità a miseria 
non era da rifiutare perché non potesse generare spavento e compassione. 
Ma dice Aristotele che non genera né spavento né compassione, ma sdegno 
contra Dio, il che è cosa abominevole. E io dico che non seguita, posto che 
sia vero che simile trapassamento di simile persona generi sdegno contra 
Dio, che non generi ancora spavento e compassione; né lo sdegno contra 
Dio annulla lo spavento e la compassione.66
(Therefore, a person of singular holiness passing from happiness into 
misery was not rejected because it could not generate fear and compassion. 
Rather, Aristotle says that such a person does not generate fear nor pity, 
but resentment against God, which is a terrible thing. Assuming that such 
a change of this kind of person does indeed generate resentment against 
God, I say that it does not follow that such a person does not also generate 
fear and pity, nor that resentment against God cancels out fear and pity.)
We might also note Castelvetro’s sleight of hand when it comes to the Aristotelian 
text. He claims that the case of a holy man falling into misfortune is refuted 
by Aristotle since it does not generate fear or compassion, but rather disdain 
against God. One the one hand, Castelvetro seems to ignore Aristotle’s claims 
in this passage that “pity is felt for a person undeserving of his misfortune” and 
“fear is felt for a person like ourselves” (1453a1). Aristotle condemns tragic 
plots depicting the downfall of a wholly virtuous character not because they are 
incapable of eliciting pity, but because the audience will be unable to identify 
with them and thus not experience fear. On the other hand, Castelvetro also 
ascribes to Aristotle statements not found in the Poetics. While the Stagirite 
claims that such plots are shocking, nowhere does he claim that virtuous 
characters are holy, or that their downfall can elicit resentment against God. 
Castelvetro’s addition of such religious, political, and social dimensions 
to the Poetics further informs his translation of hamartia: 
66. Castelvetro, 1:362.
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Ora, secondo Aristotele, se la persona santissima trapassa da felicità a 
miseria, presta cagione alla gente di mormorare contra Dio e di dolersi 
di lui che permette così fatto trapassamento; ma se la persona mezzana 
trapassa da felicità a miseria, non dà cagione alla gente di mormorare 
contra Dio né di dolersi di lui, percioché sì come ci possiamo immaginare, 
è assai ragionevole che avenga questo così fatto trapassamento a quella 
persona per gli peccati suoi, avegna che non sieno de’ più orribili del 
mondo e sieno mischiati tra alcune buone operazioni.67
(Now, according to Aristotle, if a most holy person falls from a state 
of happiness into a state of misfortune, this gives the people reason to 
grumble against God and to complain about him, that he should allow 
such an unjust fall; but if a person of middle station falls from happiness 
into misfortune, this does not give the people any reason to grumble 
against God, nor to complain about him, thus, as we can imagine, it is 
quite reasonable that such a fall should happen to this person on account 
of his sins, so long as they are not the worst in the world, and that they are 
mixed in among several good acts.)
Once again, Castelvetro has transformed Aristotle’s description of a man 
preeminent in virtue and justice into a “persona santissima.” Following the other 
commentators discussed above, Castelvetro translates hamartia as peccati, yet 
for the first time seems to provide an explicit Christian interpretation of it. 
This substitution of the Christian concept of sin for Aristotle’s notion of 
“missing the mark” is made explicit when Castelvetro reverses Aristotle’s logic 
of hamartia as precipitator of tragic consequences; if tragic events happen to a 
person who appears virtuous, the audience will not assume that God is unjust, 
but rather that this person is being punished for her sins, since there is no one 
who does not occasionally sin and since God as a fair judge will not let sins 
go unpunished.68 These passages demonstrate a profoundly Christian reading 
of Aristotle’s notion of hamartia, which builds on themes present in earlier 
Latin commentaries—the protagonist’s will and moral responsibility, and the 
67. Castelvetro, 1:370.
68. Castelvetro, 1:363.
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use of the term peccatum—to effect a specific strategy of cultural translation for 
a Christian audience. 
Castelvetro’s interpretation was certainly different than those of earlier 
commentators, perhaps due to the composition of his commentary outside of 
Italy and his contact with reformist circles on the peninsula. As Lurje has noted, 
already in 1534, Joachim Camerarius’s edition of a commentary on Sophocles 
contained an introduction that summarized elements of Aristotle’s Poetics. The 
choice of an appropriate tragic protagonist was rendered as follows:
At ubi vir bonus & honestatis virtutisque amans, indignum in malum 
impellitur quasi fatali vi, aut peccata vel non voluntate, vel ignoratione, 
quoque comissa, poenas extremas sustinent, tum et metus et misericordia 
talibus ab exemplis homines invadit, et lamenta horroresque excitantur.69
(But when a good man who loves virtue and integrity is driven into cruel 
evil as if by fate, or likewise [where] sins committed either ignorantly 
or non-voluntarily draw down great punishments, then both fear and 
pity for such examples invade [the hearts of] men, stirring up dread and 
laments.) 
While Lurje draws attention to the discussion on hamartia as an act committed 
non-voluntarily or in ignorance, we might also consider Camerarius’s use of 
“peccata […] commissa” which draw “poenas […] extremas.” This language, 
particularly the pluralization of peccatum, was also present in Castelvetro’s 
commentary, as were the moralizing tendencies of Camerarius’s colleague, 
Philipp Melanchton, whose theological work Castelvetro had previously 
translated.70 Moreover, as Saarinen notes, Melancthon’s interpretation of 
akrasia in the third edition of the Loci communes (1544–59) was strongly 
theological, positing a mental conflict whereby an individual may have had the 
light of reason, but felt their will torn between the powers of God and those of 
69. Lurje, Die Suche nach der Schuld, 94–95; Joachim Camerarius, Commentarii interpretationum 
argumenti thebaidos fabularum sophoclis (Haguenau: Officina Seceriana, 1534), 11r. Emphasis mine.
70. See Claudia Rossignoli, “ ‘L’ufficio dello ’nterprete’: Castelvetro Translator of Melanchton,” Italian 
Studies 3 (2013): 317–39; and Lorenzo Geri, “Castelvetro traduttore di Melantone,” in Lodovico 
Castelvetro: filologia e ascesi, ed. Roberto Gigliucci (Rome: Bulzoni, 2007), 241–59.
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demons.71 Both Camerarius’s and Melancthon’s complete works were placed 
on the index in 1559 and again in 1564, and thus were unavailable—at least 
through official channels—in the Italian peninsula.72 If Castelvetro did not have 
access to these texts through reformist circles in Italy, he would easily have been 
able to access them while developing his commentary in Geneva, Lyon, and 
Vienna between 1564 and 1570.
Moreover, as several recent studies have shown, Castelvetro was 
fascinated with biblical exegesis; his library contained two Hebrew grammars, 
Latin and Greek lexicons of the Christian Bible, along with Luther’s translation 
of and Erasmus’s annotations to the New Testament.73 Castelvetro also appears 
to have authored his own Italian translation of the New Testament, though 
this was lost when he had to flee Lyon due to religious upheaval in 1567.74 
Ultimately, his interest in biblical exegesis and his own practice of biblical 
translation demonstrate that Castelvetro would have been aware of the religious 
implications of translating hamartia as peccato in his commentary on the 
Poetics. It appears that the case in which Aristotelian hamartia was subjected 
to the most explicit adaptation for a Christian audience was not due to the 
influence of the Counter-Reformation, but rather may have been shaped by the 
Protestant reception of Sophocles in Northern Europe and Castelvetro’s own 
exegetical activity. This suggestion cannot be adequately developed here, yet 
merits further exploration in a future study.
 
71. Saarinen, Weakness of the Will in Renaissance and Reformation Thought, 140. Camerarius also 
comments on akrasia, positing that the mind may evaluate various courses of action quite thoroughly 
before turning to the wrong decision due to the uncertain nature of moral deliberation (Saarinen, 
Weakness of the Will in Renaissance and Reformation Thought, 150–51). However, it is doubtful that 
Castelvetro had access to his commentary on Aristotle’s Ethics as it first appeared in Frankfurt in 1570, 
the same year that Castelvetro published the Poetica d’Aristotele vulgarizzata e sposta in Vienna. 
72. Index librorum prohibitorum (Rome: Antonius Bladius, 1559); Index librorum prohibitorum (Rome: 
Paulus Manutius, 1564).
73. Rossignoli, 318–26; Andrea Barbieri, “Castelvetro, i suoi libri, e l’ambiente culturale modenese del 
suo tempo,” in Lodovico Castelvetro, ed. Gigliucci, 57–72; Geri, 245; and Valentina Grohovaz, “Lodovico 
Castelvetro traduttore della Poetica di Aristotele,” in Lodovico Castelvetro, ed. Firpo and Mongini, 47–63. 
74. Valentina Grohovaz, “Per la storia del testo della Poetica d’Aristotele vulgarizzata et sposta,” in 
Lodovico Castelvetro, ed. Gigliucci, 13–33. 
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Conclusion
Castelvetro’s explicit Christianization of hamartia was roundly criticized by the 
Sienese Alessandro Piccolomini in his 1575 commentary on the Poetics.75 As 
Alessio Cotugno has recently demonstrated, Piccolomini’s commentary takes 
frequent aim at Castelvetro’s departures from Aristotle’s text. Though he never 
refers to him by name, he consistently uses the formulation “alcuni spositori in 
lingua nostra” to denote and criticize Castelvetro’s interpretation of the Poetics.76 
Indeed, Piccolomini uses this same formula to criticize and ultimately reject 
Castelvetro’s religious interpretation of hamartia in particle 66 and translates 
hamartia as an action committed “per imprudentia, et per qualche sconsiderato 
errore” (on account of imprudence and some indiscreet error) in particle 68.77 
Much like Robortello, Maggi, and Vettori, Piccolomini cites the discussion of 
voluntary actions from the third book of the Nicomachean Ethics, mentions 
ignorance of particular circumstances, and refers to hamartia as peccato.78 Yet, 
Piccolomini dismisses the distinction between imprudence and ignorance, 
noting that such distinctions belong to the realm of moral philosophy rather 
than that of poetics. 
A noi basta di sapere in questo luogo, che l’ignorantia, che s’ha da 
trovare nelle persone convenienti alla tragedia, fa di bisogno, che sia di 
circonstantia, che venga a far il peccato minore, et per conseguente a 
recargli qualche scusa et perdono.79
(For us, it is enough to know that ignorance of circumstances—found in 
persons suitable for tragedy—is necessary insofar as it makes the sin less 
severe, and consequently permits it to be excused and pardoned.) 
75. Alessandro Piccolomini, Annotationi di M. Alesandro Piccolomini nel libro della Poetica d’Aristotele 
(Venice: Giovanni Guarisco, 1575). Concerning Piccolomini’s translation program and his view of 
translation as textual exegesis, see Refini, Per via d’annotationi, 33–41.
76. Cotugno, 172.
77. Piccolomini, 190–91.
78. Indeed, in one paragraph, Piccolomini uses peccato four times to translate hamartia (195–96).
79. Piccolomini, 197.
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While Piccolomini explicitly rejects Castelvetro’s Christianizing interpretation, 
his commentary retains the lexical traces of a religious interpretation in its use 
of terms such as peccato, scusa, perdono. 
Few Latin or vernacular commentators, with the marked exception of 
Castelvetro, appear to have read the Aristotelian concept through a strongly 
religious lens, despite their use of the term peccato/peccatum. Instead, 
hamartia was primarily interpreted through the lens of moral philosophy, 
while poetic efficacy remained paramount. From Robortello’s initial reference 
to the discussion on voluntary actions and akrasia in the Nicomachean 
Ethics to Vettori’s reinterpretation of how such an error could be committed 
imprudently, making the protagonist morally responsible, to Castelvetro’s 
Christian interpretation and its rebuttal by Piccolomini, Aristotelian moral 
philosophy played a key role in how the concept of hamartia was interpreted by 
sixteenth-century commentators.80 Moreover, the lexical choices of translators 
who were initially adapting Aristotle’s concept for a Christian audience 
formed the groundwork upon which Castelvetro was able to build his religious 
interpretation of the Poetics. Ultimately, religious and moralizing interpretations 
do not seem to have been at odds with the goal of poetic efficacy, as tacitly 
assumed by Weinberg, Hathaway, Lurje, and others. The use of peccatum/peccato 
to translate hamartia, then, does not simply reflect a broader phenomenon of 
distorting Aristotle for religious ends. Rather, it appears to have been part of 
a broader cultural strategy to domesticate the Poetics for a sixteenth-century 
Christian audience simultaneously conversant with Aristotelian philosophy 
and Counter-Reformation religious culture.
80. For the role of moral philosophy and how the Ethics was interpreted in sixteenth-century Italy, see 
Lines, Aristotle’s Ethics in the Italian Renaissance.
